



The Pull of Values

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The purpose of this paper is to carefully examine the literatures relating to the understanding and application of values in social policy. Our goal is to uncover, as concretely as possible, how FrameWorks' research relates to that body of work. In light of this goal, we will review FrameWorks' use of values and make recommendations as to how this practice may be improved.

What Are Values?

When studying values, we first need to dismiss colloquial usages of the term. When many people hear the word "values," the term brings to mind the idea of "family values" or "moral values," expressions that signal the political debate over conservative social programs. But this is not what we mean by the term; rather we are focused on something deeper and more permanent: namely, the social science use of the term. When we define values, we want to use a common meaning synthesized from several academic disciplines.

However, finding a consensus on what values mean is not easy. In the first place, as a central concept in the research on human cognition, the literature on values is vast. Rokeach (1973), a central figure in values research, saw values as a way to unify all research on social behavior, for instance. More to the point, there is little mechanism to enforce theoretical coherence across fields. According to Hitlin and Piliavan (2004) "Today, when one reads about values across the disciplines of sociology, psychology, philosophy, and political science, the balkanized nature of the research is striking. There is little coherence between the different approaches used across conceptualization and measurement of values." With that caveat in mind, we will proceed cautiously, examining several definitions and, then, rely on Schwartz's (1994) summary of the values literature across disciplines to help us find common ground.

We can start by identifying the difference between values and two other related mental constructs: attitudes and norms. Attitudes are evaluations of specific objects (Eagly and Chaiken 1993); in contrast, values are centered on more abstract ideals. Thus, most of existing research attributes to values a higher place in mental hierarchies, preceding attitudes in the formation of evaluations. FrameWorks' practice reflects this cognitive supremacy insofar as our work approaches values from the assumption that they cause attitudes. We will discuss this crucial point in detail, below.

Norms are rules that govern actions in specific situations; in contrast, values operate across situations. Values, like norms, are a phenomenon shared across a cultural group. However, values come into play on an individual level instead of through collective action. According to Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) norms exert their influence via a "push" on decisions achieved through social pressure, whereas values encapsulate a personal or cultural ideal that "pulls" actions at the individual. This distinction supports FrameWorks' practice. We see values as being relatively constant with respect to situations (though they may manifest differently according to the domain). This view again supports the notion that values cause attitudes. In this case, we expect that values

will enter situations independently, changing outcomes as a consequence of their appearance, for example, as experimental prompts. In peer discourse sessions, on the other hand, we see a slightly different process due to the fact that participants are treated as a group. This situation makes it more likely that their reaction will be governed by norms as well as by values. Critically, we should be careful to account for that possibility in the analyses.

So, what are values? In the words of the man whose name has become synonymous with values research, values are "enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (Rokeach 1973, p. 5). There are several other distinct but related definitions in the vast literature. For example, Zaller (1991: 1216) defines values as "any relatively stable, individual-level predisposition to accept or reject particular types of arguments." Kinder (1998: 808) defines values as "relatively abstract and durable claims about virtue and the good society" that "transcend particular objects and specific situations." Put yet another way, "values are core beliefs that serve as standards we use to judge our own behavior and are also a basis for organizing our political views and positions on public policies (Jennings 1991)."

In addition to offering one of the best-known values taxonomies, Schwartz (1994) identifies five features common to nearly all definitions and uses of the values concept:

- Values are beliefs and, as beliefs, they have an affective component.
- Values are a motivational construct. They refer to the desirable goals people strive to attain.
- Values transcend specific actions and situations. They are abstract goals. The abstract nature of values distinguishes them from concepts like norms and attitudes, which usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
- Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. That is, values serve as standards or criteria.
- Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. These values hierarchies then govern the application of values to a given situation, with the values at the top of the hierarchy applied to the exclusion of those below. As we will discuss further below, these hierarchies are fluid across situations so we would expect to see different values coming to the fore as inputs differ.

The more recent definitions zero in on an orienting function. Maio et al. (2003) sees values as "abstract ideals that function as important guiding principles," for instance. Given FrameWorks' concern with the dynamics of public conversations, we will prioritize this aspect of values. In short, our working definition holds that: **values are enduring beliefs, which orient individuals' attitudes and behavior. As such, effective values form the basis for social appeals that pull audiences' reactions in a desirable direction.**

Taxonomies of Values

Our search for effective orienting values begins with two sources. First, it builds upon FrameWorks' body of past research, drawing on those values that have already proven effective in lifting support for progressive policies and programs. Second, it can adapt values taken from taxonomies proposed by leading scholars. We will review the way FrameWorks' past research enters this process shortly. For now, we will concentrate on the common trends in value taxonomies. In particular, we shall discuss three leading sources on values: Milton Rokeach, the founder of values research; Shalom Schwartz, perhaps the most famous scholar studying values today and Michael Adams, whose company, Environics, has commercialized a state-of-the-art method for investigating values. In this review, we shall pay particular attention to how values are measured. The section concludes with a discussion of the problems inherent in these researchers' methods with an eye to improving FrameWorks' practice.

Milton Rokeach

Milton Rokeach virtually defined the field with the publication of his work *The Nature of Human Values* (1973); this piece is considered seminal within social science and is cited in all current values research. All of the scholars discussed here use Rokeach's definitions and, as we shall see, the signal difference between their approaches lay in the number of values under consideration and the ways to measure them.

Rokeach's definition of values has been discussed above. Here, we are concerned with his methodology. Beginning with a distinction between instrumental and terminal values, where instrumental values concern means and terminal values concern ends, Rokeach developed a list of 18 terminal values (the origins of this list are murky). He asked respondents to order these values from most desirable to least desirable. That list is presented here, both as an illustration and in the hopes that FrameWorks will be able to consider specific values in the context of future research.

Rokeach's Terminal Values:

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. A comfortable life | 10. Mature love |
| 2. An exciting life | 11. National security |
| 3. A sense of accomplishment | 12. Pleasure |
| 4. A world at peace | 13. Salvation |
| 5. Equality | 14. Self-respect |
| 6. Family security | 15. Social recognition |
| 7. Freedom | 16. True friendship |
| 8. Happiness | 17. Wisdom |
| 9. Inner harmony | 18. A World of Beauty |

The pressing criticism of Rokeach stems from his ranking method. Rankings are often viewed as conceptually more appropriate for value measurement, but also as relatively difficult for respondents. Further, according to psychometric theory, single items are flawed because they cannot be pure measures of the underlying construct due to input from irrelevant variables and random error. Simply put asking one question is not enough to identify a latent concept, so researchers typically use three or more questions and

factor analysis to “triangulate” on a result. Thus, the findings obtained from Rokeach’s work are hard to generalize and apply easily to novel situations. However, this taxonomy has some worth, insofar as his values present useful points of departure, as discussed below.

Shalom Schwartz:

The second most cited researcher in the values literature is Shalom Schwartz. We reviewed his definitional contribution earlier; for our purposes, he adds two more aspects to the values discussion. First, Schwartz introduces a greatly expanded set of values (moving from 18 to 58), establishing a trend of continuous expansion in the list of values considered for future researchers. Second, Schwartz introduces a new method of rating values in place of the earlier ranking method.

Schwartz asked respondents to rate a list of values on their personal importance, that is whether they are important or not to them as individuals. Ratings measures are thought to be easier to administer and less difficult for respondents. For example, keeping a list of 58 values in mind in order to rank them in importance is cognitively impossible. Furthermore, the statistical analysis of ratings is substantially less cumbersome than analysis of rankings as in the Rokeach example above. The shift to ratings is a necessity.

Below are the values Schwartz uses, some of which may be valuable for FrameWorks to test in future research.

The Schwartz Values Survey:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Equality | 23. Social recognition |
| 2. Inner harmony | 24. Unity with nature |
| 3. Social power | 25. A varied life |
| 4. Pleasure | 26. Wisdom |
| 5. Freedom | 27. Authority |
| 6. A spiritual life | 28. True friendship |
| 7. Sense of belonging | 29. A world of beauty |
| 8. Social order | 30. Social justice |
| 9. An exciting life | 31. Independent |
| 10. Meaning in life | 32. Moderate |
| 11. Politeness | 33. Loyal |
| 12. Wealth | 34. Ambitious |
| 13. National security | 35. Broadminded |
| 14. Self respect | 36. Humble |
| 15. Reciprocation of favors | 37. Daring |
| 16. Creativity | 38. Protecting the environment |
| 17. A world at peace | 39. Influential |
| 18. Respect for tradition | 40. Honoring of parents and elders |
| 19. Mature love | 41. Choosing own goals |
| 20. Self discipline | 42. Healthy |
| 21. Privacy | 43. Capable |
| 22. Family security | 44. Accepting my portion in life |

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 45. Honest | 53. Curious |
| 46. Preserving my public image | 54. Forgiving |
| 47. Obedient | 55. Successful |
| 48. Intelligent | 56. Clean |
| 49. Helpful | 57. Self-indulgent |
| 50. Enjoying life | 58. Observing social norms |
| 51. Devout | |
| 52. Responsible | |

Environics:

A more recent effort to identify values and incorporate them into a predictive model of human cognition has been conducted by Michael Adams and the corporation he founded, Environics. Environics is worth considering because of its use of state of the art measurement techniques on an extremely large—numbering roughly a hundred—list of values; however, Environics’ works should be used cautiously because its data and methods are largely proprietary, and because, as a for-profit company with a market-orientation, its researchers focus on consumer behavior. In this respect, many of the values that Adams and his organization uses are narrowly focused on individual purchasing and may not prove applicable to more pro-social community-oriented behavior.

In a slight twist on other practitioners, Environics defines values as “motivated cognition.” Adams notes that practices are often framed or “spun” in terms of the higher order values they represent. So, beyond their conceptions as desirable or prescribed means and ends of living (as in Rokeach), Environics suggests that the concept of values captures the deeper motivations behind human thought, feeling, and behavior.

The central claim is that a host of different aspects of people's worldviews can be captured by an assessment of their "values," so defined. These aspects include: perceptions, patterns of thought, expectation, attitudes, judgments, and opinions; as well as behavioral tendencies and actions. Values stand in, then, as a good description for a whole host of mental, emotional, and motivational “preparednesses” (or "sets") that drive how we act in the world. This work introduces two new concepts: worldviews, which are largely not operationalized, and the idea of preparedness, which seems related to what we would call “expectations.” In this vein, FrameWorks also relied on work by linguist Deborah Tannen (1998) who remarks that expectations about how the world works are predisposed by values.

For FrameWorks’ purposes, Environics offers two salient gifts. First, it has the widest imaginable list of values, roughly 100 values, which may provide fodder for future research although many of them are directed at consumer behavior. Second, Environics employs a more sophisticated measurement procedure.

Here is the list of Environics’ values, with the values that seem the likeliest candidates for FrameWorks underlined:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. <u>Acceptance of Violence</u> | 2. <u>Active Government</u> |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|

3. Adaptability to Complexity
4. Adaptive Navigation
5. Advertising as Stimulus
6. American Dream
7. Anomie and Aimlessness
8. Attraction to Crowds
9. Aversion to Complexity
10. Brand Apathy
11. Buying on Impulse
12. Celebrating Passages
13. Civic Apathy
14. Civic Engagement
15. Community Involvement
16. Confidence in Advertising
17. Confidence in Big business
18. Confidence in Small business
19. Cultural Assimilation
20. Culture Sampling
21. Discerning Hedonism
22. Discriminating Consumerism
23. Duty
24. Ecological Concern
25. Ecological Fatalism
26. Effort Toward Health
27. Emotional Control
28. Enthusiasm for New Technology
29. Entrepreneurialism
30. Equal Relationship with Youth
31. Ethical Consumerism
32. Everyday Ethics
33. Everyday Rage
34. Faith in Science
35. Fatalism
36. Fear of Violence
37. Financial Security
38. Flexible Families
39. Flexible Gender Identity
40. Gender Parity
41. Global Consciousness
42. Heterarchy
43. Holistic Health
44. Importance of Aesthetics
45. Importance of Brand
46. Importance of Spontaneity
47. Interest in the Unexplained
48. Introspection and Empathy
49. Intuition and Impulse
50. Joy of Consumption
51. Just Deserts
52. Largesse Oblige
53. Living Virtually
54. Look Good Feel Good
55. Meaningful Moments
56. More Power for Business
57. More Power for Media
58. More Power for Politics
59. Multiculturalism
60. Mysterious Forces
61. National Pride
62. Need for Status Recognition
63. Networking
64. Obedience to Authority
65. Ostentatious Consumption
66. Parochialism
67. Patriarchy
68. Penchant for Risk
69. Personal Challenge
70. Personal Control
71. Personal Creativity
72. Personal Escape
73. Personal Expression
74. Primacy of the Family
75. Pursuit of Intensity
76. Racial Fusion
77. Rejection of Authority
78. Rejection of Order
79. Religion a la Carte
80. Religiosity
81. Saving on Principle
82. Search for Roots
83. Selective Use of Personal Services
84. Sensualism
85. Sexism
86. Sexual Permissiveness
87. Skepticism of Advertising
88. Social Intimacy
89. Social Responsibility
90. Spiritual Quest
91. Technology Anxiety
92. Time Stress
93. Traditional Family
94. Traditional Gender Identity
95. Vitality
96. Voluntary Simplicity
97. Work Ethic

98. Xenophobia

To measure values in the contemporary milieu, Environics and most researchers rely on Likert Scales. Other researchers deploying this methodology include the prestigious National Election Studies (NES) and Yankelovich. The idea behind Likert measurements is to triangulate on the value in question by assessing respondents' agreement with several statements. For example to measure equality, NES asks if respondents agree that "our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed." By providing several statements, usually three, for each value and using factor analysis to combine the answers to multiple questions, contemporary research identifies more stable measures of underlying values.

Although they use this more refined technique, the NES doesn't pay much substantive attention to values. To elaborate, coverage has been limited to beliefs about equality (1984-2004), traditional family values (1986-2004), moral tolerance (1986-2006), self-reliance (1984-286), and humanitarianism (1996)— a somewhat paltry interest in this topic when compared to other researchers. DYG Yankelovich uses a similar method to recover underlying values though their product, DYG Scan, is proprietary, and it has been difficult to uncover their list of values with available information. Finally, it is worth mentioning the World Values Survey, whose name suggests a deep affinity to these values researchers. However, surprisingly, the World Values Survey does not postulate any finite list of values or use any of the above methods to try to identify values in its respondents.

Interim Conclusion

This review should highlight the common process undertaken by these values researchers. They share two basic steps: first, propose a list of values and, second, use that list to assess the values of a variety of respondents using a favored measure. The question this process begs is where these values come from. It would be too harsh to say it is arbitrary, but on the other hand there seems to be no way to come to a consensus about a finite list of values. As can be seen, the number of values has been steadily expanding across the time spanned by the researchers we have examined. Only Adams, in his book *Fire and Ice* (2003), directly pinpoints the source of his values, somewhat problematically stating that they emerge from on the street interviews, including focus groups, and consultation with experts. This description, if accurate, implies that this method is too haphazard to rigorously apply to new issue domains.

In a nutshell, the problem is how to draw the line as to what is and what isn't a value. Here, we are caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, limiting the purview to too few values runs the risk of failing to encompass the diversity of human goals. Converse, (1964) whom we shall discuss shortly, speaks to this point. On the other hand, if every goal can be taken to be a value, the concept violates its own definition. More precisely, if any goal becomes a value, pathologies arise. To illustrate, having a desire to get to the other side of this street will orient my activity, but we do not want to call it a value in the above sense. Conversely, wanting to get to other side of the street safely contains a value, namely the preservation of life, which probably does meet the standards described above.

Moreover, it is important for FrameWorks to note that these various taxonomies and methods are imbued with an orientation that is not entirely consonant with FrameWorks' own mission. That is, both Rokeach and Schwartz co-mingle what can be called personal goals, like spiritual fulfillment, and collective goals, like a just society, whereas FrameWorks is interested primarily in the goals that have the potential to drive reasoning about collective or public programs and policies. Thus, the personal orientation inherent in the more psychologically derived literature is problematic for FrameWorks. Similarly, the Environics approach is imbued with an orientation to people as consumers, and fails to distinguish between collective action as the aggregate of individual actions and a full appreciation for societies as more dynamic entities. Thus, a bias toward commercialism poses problems for FrameWorks in the adaptation of this particular taxonomy.

Perhaps finding a value simply entails digging deeply enough into a given situation in order to uncover a transcendent goal. This observation provides a good rationale for searching for values in cognitive interviews and peer discourse sessions, as discussed below. At the same time, we can employ the lists provided, adding to them as the occasion arises. The warning here is to keep in mind the requirement that any value transcends situations in an enduring way. Moreover, the taxonomy of values with which FrameWorks emerges may need to be measured against its mission more closely in order to winnow out those values that certainly exist but are oriented toward goals and actions less appropriate for inclusion in work related to public issues and policies.

How then can we identify values? No answer to this question is without controversy, again because some people are inclined to say everything is a value while others adhere to the position that there are very few ultimate values. We recommend that FrameWorks follow a two-track approach to verify that a suggested candidate for inclusion in any kind of prime is a value.

- First, it must be terminal in some sense. In other words, it must be an ultimate underlying motivation (UUM) for a particular attitude. The best way to uncover such a UUM in practice may be repeated probing in cognitive interviews, peer discourse sessions, or in open-ended responses to quantitative surveys. Because operative values are not always accessible to their users, this probing may take some time and require effort. Ultimately, however, the answer to repeated questions of the form “why is that good?” or “what is your goal in doing this?” should reveal a UUM.
- On a second track, our definition implies that a value is shared widely in our culture, durable over time and easily communicable to other people. In this vein, it is possible to look up the root word of any putative value in a corpus of English and decide if those elements of discourse have the requisite normative component. Because common linguistic understanding of the label to a critical mass of people as a value is synonymous with its ability to transcend situations, such a focal property in linguistic culture gives a putative value currency.

- Third, we need to bear in mind that some concepts used in the place of values in common discourse are not values. For example, conventional discourse about medical insurance postulates that health is a driving factor in the public's reasoning. In this sense, then, health is acting as a value; however, health does not fulfill the UUM criteria outlined above. Instead, health is acting as a placeholder for the underlying value. FrameWorks often tests these placeholders in its research to show that extant discourse does not promote attitude change in the same way as authentic values would.

Parallel evidence from these tracks should reassure us that something is indeed a value, but we must keep in mind that a looser criterion is better in that it increases the chances of capturing effective candidates for communication.

How Values Work

To see how values work, we need to situate them within FrameWorks' theory of discourse-based social change. At its core, this theory models how changes in discourse, especially framing interventions, alter people's policy dispositions and other attitudes. To understand this theory, we will examine the distinctions between three key elements: public discourse, frames and cultural models.

The first element in Frameworks' triumvirate is public discourse. We view public discourse as the aggregate of all conversations. These conversations take place between people, especially in public forums like the media or on web sites. Because FrameWorks tackles social problems on an issue-by-issue basis, our examinations of public discourse extend to all the conversations relevant to a particular domain—public safety, for instance. In these examinations, we are looking for standardized patterns in talk that reveal the dominant and recessive modes of communicating that issue's dynamics. The way we conduct these examinations is simply by studying public texts, like newspapers, or talking to people, as in on-the-street interviews.

Cultural models are the second element in FrameWorks' triumvirate. The examinations of conversations with people and textual analysis evidence the patterns that people have in mind as they approach a particular issue. We call these mental patterns cultural models, which closely resemble the mental constructs psychologists call schema. These models are the implicit and explicit ways that people understand or give meanings to specific issues. Cultural models contain propositional as well as affective components, where propositions are statements as to the way the world does or should work. Some examples of the content of cultural models are propositions of importance, connections between things and descriptive models that people use to categorize and so to understand particular facts.

With regard to values, the most salient dimension of cultural models is the range of propositions on the continuum between purely descriptive accounts of *what is* versus

models about *the way things should be*. In short, any given model can be imbued with value content, keeping in mind our definition of values as encompassing orienting goals. In addition, cultural models are nested; in other words, they are organized hierarchically with smaller more specific models at the bottom and broad, all encompassing models at the top. When these top or “master” models contain content at the *what-should-be* end of the spectrum, they are highly value-laden and are essentially values. In fact, at the extreme end of the continuum concerning the way things should be, master cultural models may be isomorphic with values. These value models serve the orienting function, structuring goals and ideas about what matters across circumstances with notions about what is good and what is right.

The final element, the frame, is a rhetorical construct embedded in discourse that provides the leverage to understanding and affecting the entire process. Simply put, frames tie public discourse to cultural models. As communicative structures, frames are a matter of selective emphasis; when frames and their constituent elements draw attention toward certain aspects of an issue and away from others, they channel subsequent thinking. This happens because of frames’ ability to activate certain cultural models as frames pass into recipients’ minds. Thus, when people hear discourse featuring certain frames, they activate particular sets of cultural models that guide attitudes and behaviors, such as answers to interviews or experimental survey questions. At this point, people’s values induce valences on possible actions; that is, actions become more valued if those actions (including attitudes) will promote the attainment of valued goals (Feather, 1995).

There are several lines of research, which support this associative model of thinking about framing effects. In my own research, (Simon and Jerit 2007) respondents exposed to a prime including the word “baby” were much more supportive of banning partial birth abortion (PBA) than respondents primed with “fetus.” The operative theory in this investigation was that baby brought to mind considerations of motherhood and innocence (etc.) while fetus was associated with other considerations like science and embryo. Under the former associations, PBA was distasteful while under the latter, not so much. More broadly, Khaneman (2011) suggests that all primes operate in an automatic way that he calls System 1 in mental processes that are beneath the level of conscious thought (what he calls System 2). As one can see, this sub rosa behavior gives rise to an enormous potential for the successful application of values primes, which we will discuss in the next section.

In this rubric, values are inherent in all three elements. Values play a large role, either explicitly or implicitly in discourse. In each issue area, certain values are dominant in that they pervade public conversations; other values are recessive in that they appear infrequently, if at all. These values, especially the dominant one, course through the frames embedded in that discourse. As frames leap from discourse into people’s heads, they carry values, especially the dominant, along with them. Inside the head, that frame, and the value it contains, cues certain cultural models, especially the master model that corresponds to that frame. That master model and the value with which it is imbued remain active to guide subsequent reasoning about that issue. FrameWorks research reflects this process as it tracks frames and the values they hold through the trajectory from discourse to frames and ending up in the decision making that goes on inside

people's heads. At this final stage, the cueing of certain cultural models results in predispositions toward particular policies and other attitudes.

The critical lesson to take away from this theory is that values, as articulated in discourse and transferred via frames, have directive force via the orientation offered by activating values in respondents' minds. These values in mind organize propositions about the way the world should work (as well as other statements relevant to that domain) and so give those propositions greater weight in the decision-making that serves as the background for subsequent attitudes. This lesson carries one fundamental implication--changing the values in discourse, and its embedded frames, can lead to the activation of different cultural models and thereby redirect people's thinking. We shall discuss Nelson and Willey's development of this lesson shortly.

It is for this redirecting capability that values play such a large role in FrameWorks' research. In the first place, as stated, FrameWorks' methodology tracks values through the trajectory from discourse to frames, ending up in peoples' minds to influence decision-making. Carefully following this trajectory gives FrameWorks an understanding of the dynamics surrounding public issues. This understanding identifies the ways to enhance and guide that conversation. This is especially true with regard to values. With understanding, a precise intervention (as specified using cognitive interviews and quantitative pre-testing) can change the master model governing particular sets of decisions, reorienting subsequent attitudes and policy predispositions.

The structure that FrameWorks suggests advocates use in their communications also reflects the importance of values. FrameWorks advises that messages be organized around a typology of levels. The first, top level in this hierarchy is the value. The second and third levels refer to the issue area, again like public safety, and specific policies, like changing mandatory sentencing, respectively. The idea behind this hierarchy, in line with the theory about how values work, is to provide a concrete orientation at the first level to guide reasoning at the second and third levels. Hence, the first piece of advice that FrameWorks offers advocates is to lead with the right value in all their communications. Thus, a major part of FrameWorks research is to find the right value for issue communicators to deploy.

The Effects of Values

Given understandings of what values are and how they work, it is natural to inquire as to their effects. This discussion of the relationship between values and outcomes follows two paths. First, we cover a fundamental finding from public opinion research, namely that no single value can account for the diversity of attitudes the public holds. Second, we discuss the implications of this finding by reviewing the work of relevant researchers.

The Indeterminacy of Values

One central finding from political science research points to the difficulty of using values to predict attitudes and behavior. On the other hand, the competition between values that this finding implies suggests that values interventions may have powerful effects on

political predispositions. According to Converse (1964) “A realistic picture of political belief systems in the mass public, then, is not one that omits issues and policy demands completely nor one that presumes widespread ideological coherence; it is rather one that captures with some fidelity the fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of these demands.”

In other words, most citizens do not deduce opinions about issues from a stable ideology of the liberal-conservative type, nor any other single overriding goal. In its place, people use a variety of social and political constructs, including values (Feldman 1988), to ground decisions and attitudes about public policies. Without going into great detail about the voluminous evidence underlying this finding, we can discuss the ramifications it presents to values research.

Factually, there are remarkably few people, roughly one percent, according to Converse (1964), in our society who maintain a single value as a bedrock worldview and then use that value as the basis for decisions across all situations and issues. Reasoning proceeds, for the overwhelming majority of people, haphazardly, using information readily available to make decisions on a case-by-case basis (Zaller 1991). As Feldman (1988) finds, values are an important part of this mix. Thus, in current thinking about public opinion, each attitude or policy predisposition reflects what comes to mind in a competition of considerations that change from situation to situation.

On the one hand, this reality of public opinion makes it highly unlikely that we will find strong correlations between values and behavior if we choose random situations and correlate them against value measurements. Accordingly, empirical evidence suggests that the value–behavior relation is frequently weak and moderated by several factors (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2003). Situational factors, for one, can impact the strength of the value–behavior relation. For example, in one famous experiment, seminary students, who presumably advocate helpfulness, did not assist a needy person when they were late to give a talk (Darley & Batson, 1973). This hurry effect persisted even when they had just been asked to discuss the parable of the Good Samaritan, which made the value salient. Scholars argue that this incongruent behavior resulted from the inability of participants to have the time to see the situation as mandating helpfulness. The caution to note here is the inability or difficulty of getting values to “set” in order to produce effects.

One theory proposes that whether a given action is defined (or not) in terms of its larger meaning and significance will be an important factor affecting congruency of values and behaviors. (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The bulk of the field concentrates on the activation of values, as we will discuss shortly. In this view, values are believed to affect subsequent attitudes and behavior only if they are accessible, i.e., the more easily a value comes to mind, the more likely it will be activated (Verplanken & Holland, 2002).

This theory (and others) does not, however, answer the question of whether these value activations are explicit or implicit. In other words, are people conscious of the value they are using in these situations? Notice Khaneman’s (2011) model of cognition leans toward the implicit. The answer to this question has major implications for FrameWorks’ examination of values. For example, in a cognitive interview should we limit our focus to

the content of what respondents say to locate motivating values or should we “read between the lines” and try to infer the motivating value from their responses? In line with Khaneman’s thinking and my own research, it seems reasonable to suspect that the activation of values is implicit and thus demands an approach that goes beyond the literal content of participants’ responses.

On the bright side of this equation is the fact that values do exert impacts in particular situations. Here, the possibility that values compete for application on a case-by-case basis opens the space for FrameWorks’ program.

Values and Framing

Our primary interest is in framing, where values are implicitly or explicitly implicated throughout the process. We are particularly interested in values as independent variables, the causative factor behind attitude change and behavior. Thus, this review focuses on framing interventions that revolve around embedded values. The literature on values and framing speaks to the impact values prompts can have on people’s policy predispositions and other attitudes.

Ryan (1991) makes the first overt application of values in the context of framing. Though she calls them “appeals to principle,” the examples she offers showing how to apply her typology of framing to the analysis of text make it clear that she is referring to the same constructs we are calling values; in this vein she discusses helping the poor and fighting communism as two principles, for instance. Ryan’s taxonomy is picked up by Winett (1997) who makes a more formal application of Ryan’s framing elements, including core frame, core position, metaphor, historical example, catch phrases, depictions, visual images, roots and consequences.

Another contributor to develop the relationship between values and framing is George Lakoff. In his book *Moral Politics* (1996), Lakoff’s account emphasizes the framing of political discourse in terms of fundamental value systems. Lakoff goes on to argue that the value systems present in American politics are diametrically opposed. On one side is the “strict father” who resorts to discipline and punishment to deal with the weakness inherent in human nature. This value outlook is associated with a belief in limited government, making most domestic problems a matter of individual responsibility. On the other side, progressives prefer policies that stem from the “nurturing parent” point of view. They believe that with appropriate care everyone has the capacity to develop into decent adults. This view of human nature leads to support for a more expansive set of governmental responsibilities. More broadly, Lakoff sees these views, especially the values they embody, as being at the core of political disputes. When conflicts over policies arise, each side seeks to mobilize advantageous values in order to prevail. Simply put, the side with resonant values wins.

Notice the two key characteristics of Lakoff’s competition. First, the crucial step to winning public approval lies in articulating the value in discourse via the frames embedded therein. In fact, the bulk of Lakoff’s recent work attempts to coach progressives on the way to incorporate values within frames. Second, Lakoff, along with most political scientists, sees competition for mass approval being played out among

policy moderates. These undecided or “swing” voters come to political battles with no dog in the fight, quite unlike their more partisan fellows. We would do well to recognize that what makes these partisans so partisan is the values they espouse, which translate directly into the preconceived notions partisans bring to the political table. The upshot is that committed partisans try to use their values, embedding them in frames, to convince the undecided to support their side. On the flip side, it is those uncommitted people who have to respond to frames and the values they contain.

Nelson and Willey (2003) offer a slightly more sophisticated version of Lakoff’s theory. Their model is based around the idea that frames are “a compass for navigating values conflicts.” (p. 246). Value-conflicts, their key concept, arise when multiple values compete to determine specific attitudes and policy predispositions. Satisfyingly, their definition of a value is congruent with the ones we have discussed—desirable end-state, but they add a crucial new innovation. Nelson and Willey argue that value hierarchies are flexible in that they are subject to influence by forces like framing. This critical insight means that the value at the heart of decision-making processes changes from situation to situation. **This is not to say that the value itself changes but rather one value of the many available steps to the fore, thereby guiding decisions.** According to Nelson and Willey (2003), frames are one key factor that determines which value rises to the fore. They also offer experimental evidence that demonstrates that differing value frames cue different values among respondents, substantially altering policy predispositions.

Shah, Domke and Wackman (2003) offer a similar theory that also centers on values as an element of frames. Their theory of value framing “asserts that politicians and social activists struggle over the values used to define issues to build public support for the perspectives they endorse.” (p. 228). They examine the effects of value-framing empirically, testing the effects of value frames on evangelical Christians and undergraduate students by contrasting ethical value frames, involving the “language of morals,” with material value frames, which involve the “language of economics.” Consistent with FrameWorks’ theory, they postulate that these values activate alternative schema (cultural models) in the minds of respondents, which will then affect subsequent processing strategies and vote choice. Indeed, that is exactly what they found. In an experimental design, participants exposed to ethical value frames were more likely to rely on available schema concerning fundamental moral principles and to evaluate candidates accordingly.

In short, receiving the information embedded in one frame, as opposed to a different frame, can promote the particular value encoded in that frame, as opposed to the value encoded in alternative frames. This value then rises to the top of the pile of potential orienting factors inside of people’s minds. That position then allows the successful value to guide decisions, influencing policy predispositions and other attitudes.

Given this way of thinking about values in frames, FrameWorks can move beyond the fact that values are central framing elements to create a catalog of values for application in prescriptive research. Such a catalog is discussed in the next section.

Recommendations

Based on this discussion, several recommendations for FrameWorks' practice come to mind.

Maintaining Critical Elements of Existing Practice

Our outline of values and the way they work underscores several features of our current practices that may have been taken for granted. The chief conclusion is that we should preserve a central focus on values in research and advice to issues communicators. Their omnipresent nature means that our practice cannot avoid dealing with values. At the same time, their key place in decision-making renders values extraordinarily powerful. Finally, the flexibility in values hierarchies translates into potential interventions with an extraordinarily high “bang for the buck,” in terms of moving people toward more desirable views. These factors, in combination, call for a renewed emphasis on values in FrameWorks' operations. In short, we should recognize that an effective value is a primary deliverable and align our operations accordingly.

In line with this focus on values, two points concerning our assumptions can be made more explicit. We see values as playing a causal role in subsequent decisions. Thus, we should retain our use of values as independent variables in quantitative and qualitative methods. In other words, this discussion reinforces the use of values as treatments in experimental surveys and as primes in peer discourse sessions.

Securing Candidate Values in Particular Issue Domains

We should integrate the task of finding candidate values with other methods employed by FrameWorks. As stated, one of our central goals is to deliver an effective value to inform better issue communications; finding effective values means starting out with a systematic body of candidate values with high potential to take into quantitative and qualitative testing. This task can be given higher priority in earlier steps in the research process. We already do this to some extent, so we should extend and enhance this impulse in cultural model interviews, seeking to locate the master models that guide or have the potential to guide subsequent thinking. The same step can be taken with experts.

At this stage in our practice, our expert researchers should not forget their ability to probe values thinking. For example, in the cultural models interviews, interviewers can already begin to think about values that can overcome the gaps between expert and ordinary thinking, and then to test these hypotheses in follow up questions as laid out in the research guides. To the extent it is not done already, the reports stemming from these interviews should highlight the values-related findings with an eye toward employing them in later research steps—not to mention increasing the insight that these reports provide.

This potential for probing may be particularly important in the peer discourse sessions. There we have the opportunity to delve deeply into the motivational factors that govern responses to the primes, trying to separate true expressions of values—that is ones that

resonate with the primes, from the demands driven by appearing in a group setting, what we would call norms. The direct communication between moderator and group may also be used to extract values from the group in a more open-ended fashion, as we may do under point four below.

Inventory of Values

The most vital needs for FrameWorks is to secure a more rigorous list of pre-candidate values standing by for deployment in qualitative and quantitative research. Much like the three researchers, Rokeach, Schwartz and Environics, we discussed, for better or worse, lists of values serve as the starting point for values research. Such an inventory would serve FrameWorks by providing an initial take on what values could be applied to particular projects. This inventory would also function as a working institutional memory by tracking more rigorously the values we have used in the past as well as the results they obtained. Suzanne Lo is in the process of developing this database.

Three sources are available to populate the list. First, and most important, is the collection of the values FrameWorks has used in the past. This source would provide the institutional memory mentioned above. To date, it exists in a largely unexamined and informal form. Second, we could screen and capture values from the sources outlined here. This search would be done opportunistically, trying to locate likely candidates for our studies. So, for example, we can review Environics' hundred values and commandeer those that have a social, progressive focus. This winnowing, with criteria to be developed by FrameWorks, allows us to reject values that are not appropriate to our mission and, therefore, to overcome some of the problems inherent in a more "off the shelf" combination of these sources. Even though this exercise may only yield a few values, the potential power from these untapped constructs can outweigh any expense. This idea of expense extends to proprietary sources like DYG Scan; it may be worth the money to buy their values list, to review it for the same purpose.

We should see this list as cumulative. As new values enter our practice, the list can be expanded to accommodate them. For instance, should the expert interviews uncover a likely candidate, that value would be entered into the list for future use.

It would seem the list should contain roughly 60 values, about the same size as Schwartz's inventory, so that it not be too big to be manageable but not too small to exclude some likely values candidates. The values do not have to be mutually exclusive or wholly non-overlapping, for example, the value of pragmatism and responsible management are related and yet each can still find places on the list. To make the list more efficient, we might want to organize it around common problems that often find their way into map the gaps reports. The idea is to match candidate values to problems identified in qualitative work. For example, if we find a lack of shared fate, we would match up values that have been used in the past to address this hole. Likewise, prevention can be categorized as a solution to little picture thinking, i.e. seeing short-term not long term.

Using Partisanship to Search for Values in Specific Domains

We can try new ways of searching for values in specific domains. The immediate goal of this procedure is to find candidate values for quantitative work. The idea is inspired by Lakoff's intuition that the values espoused by strong partisans are relatively inflexible and that these values compete among the less partisan for application.

This study, which can be deployed as an add-on to the experimental surveys, would use YouGov to poll roughly 100 respondents aligned with either a strongly liberal or strongly conservative viewpoint. These respondents would be asked an open-ended question, like "what goals do you think should guide public policy in the relevant issue area." Analysis of the response would produce a map of the values used by these more politically active citizens in order for them to be included in the pool of possible candidates for further testing. If more money is available, we could also poll independents to determine the constellation of values already in the environment to find out what "raw material" there is to work with, in coordination with the cultural model interviews. The protocol would then seek to apply the UUM idea to their coded responses.

Such a small study would be relatively inexpensive, around \$1500 for the data, and allow us to confirm our expectations about what values might prove effective in the much more expensive experimental portion of the study. As a side benefit, this study could replicate portions of the cultural model interviews and assist in the development of simplifying models, given the addition of germane questions to the mix.

Synthetic Testing

In the fifth place, we can use our quantitative research to conduct more realistic assessments of prospective messages. We can think about two areas specifically.

The first area is something FrameWorks has already discussed, namely to use the experimental surveys as an opportunity to jointly test values and simplifying models synergistically. Such a design would occur at the last stage of the research process and be integrated as the icing on the cake of the research memo. The idea would be to test the most effective value and the most effective model simultaneously in order to demonstrate how effective our recommendations would be.

In a related, second, vein, the stimuli used as treatments in this capping test, could also be configured as realistic messages. Up to this point, it has been widespread in FrameWorks' practice to offer meta-messages to clients and to shy away from developing actual messages. It might be worthwhile to attempt a test of a realistic message, complete with a level one value, a level two issue and a level three policy, at this last stage of the research process. As a basis for comparison we could use a control group or perhaps more effectively an "unimproved" message taken from advocates' extant messaging strategy. Such a test could provide unambiguous evidence of our recommendation's superiority, proving to be a valuable tool to promote the dissemination of our findings.

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Appendix: A Catalog of Useful Values

Candidates for Testing:

Accomplishment
American Dream
Authority
Civic Engagement
Confidence in Big Business
Consumerism
Creativity
Cultural Assimilation
Diversity
Duty
Environmental Protection
Equal Relationship with Youth
Equality
Ethical Consumerism
Faith in Science
Family Security
Financial Security
Freedom
Gender Parity
Global Consciousness
Happiness
Independence
Introspection and Empathy
Loyalty
Moderation
National Pride
National Security
Parochialism
Patriarchy

Peace
Personal Expression
Politeness
Primacy of the Family
Privacy
Respect for Authority
Religiosity
Respect for Authority
Responsibility
Salvation
Saving on Principle
Self-respect
Sense of Belonging
Social Justice
Social Order
Social Power
Social Recognition
Social Responsibility
Technological Progress
Tradition
Wealth
Wisdom
Xenophobia

Already tested:

Common Good
Connection
Crisis
Empowerment.
Fairness
Fairness Across Places

Fairness Between Groups
Future Preparation
Global Competition
Health
Ingenuity
Innovation
Interconnectedness
Interdependence
Kyoto
Legacy/Steward
Opportunity for all
Pragmatism
Prevention
Progress
Prosperity
Responsible Management
Scientific Authority.
Social Justice
Stewardship